including the use of armed force" to assist South Vietnam (the resolution passed the House 416 to 0, and the Senate 88 to 2; in January 1971 President Nixon signed legislation that included its "repeal"). The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. Thousands of passengers are stranded after Colombias Viva Air grounds flights, The last of Mexicos artisanal salt-makers preserve a 2,000-year-old tradition, I cannot give up: Cambodian rapper says he will sing about injustice despite threats from govt, Ukrainian rock star reflects on a year of war in his country, Ukrainian refugees in Poland will now be charged to stay in state-funded housing, This Colombian town is dimming its lights to attract more tourists to view the night sky, Kneel and apologize!: 76 years after island-wide massacre, Taiwan continues to commemorate and debate the tragedy. By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. 14. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. 8. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. On 28 July, the latest specially fitted destroyer, the Maddox (DD-731), set out from Taiwan for the South China Sea. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. He is the author of. The North also protested the South Vietnamese commando raid on Hon Me Island and claimed that the Desoto Mission ships had been involved in that raid. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. 1, p. 646. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. 9/11. 2. The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. The crews quietly made last-minute plans, then split up. . Easily outdistancing the North Vietnamese boat, the commandos arrived back at Da Nang shortly after daybreak.8, North Vietnam immediately and publicly linked the 34A raids and the Desoto patrol, a move that threatened tentative peace feelers from Washington that were only just reaching Hanoi. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. This explanation held briefly, long enough for President Johnson -- admittedly not inclined to engage in what might be called oververification -- to rush the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. When Did the U.S. The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. The 122 additional relevant SIGINT products confirmed that the Phu Bai station had misinterpreted or mistranslated many of the early August 3 SIGINT intercepts. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. "We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. To increase the chances of success, SOG proposed increased raids along the coast, emphasizing offshore bombardment by the boats rather than inserting commandos. "11 The intelligence community, including its SIGINT component, responded with a regional buildup to support the increase in U.S. operational forces. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. "1 Most of these would be shore bombardment. He readthe chiefs a cable from the captain of the Maddox. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 Early Military Career Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. Illumination rounds shot skyward, catching the patrol boats in their harsh glare. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. The contacts were to the northeast of the ship, putting them about 100 nautical miles from North Vietnam but very close to Chinas Hainan Island. The North Vietnamese coastal radars also tracked and reported the positions of U.S. aircraft operating east of the ships, probably the combat air patrol the Seventh Fleet had ordered in support. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. 9. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate . The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. Just before midnight, the four boats cut their engines. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. Those early mistakes led U.S. destroyers to open fire on spurious radar contacts, misinterpret their own propeller noises as incoming torpedoes, and ultimately report an attack that never occurred. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. McNamara and the JCS believed that this intercept decisively provided the smoking gun of the second attack, and so the president reported to the American people and Congress. The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. Suns and Stars American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. Fluoride. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States Although McNamara did not know it at the time, part of his statement was not true; Captain Herrick, the Desoto patrol commander, did know about the 34A raids, something that his ships logs later made clear. In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. ", "No," replied McCone. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. Then North Vietnams naval authorities either became confused or were seized by indecision. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. Haiphong again repeated the recall order after the attack. He spoke out against banning girls education. Through the evening of Aug. 4, while no new information arrivedto clarify the eventin the Gulf, the White House narrative was firmly in place. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. 3. They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. . On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. McNamara was ready to respond. We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. . In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. This volume deals only with the former. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. That very night, the idea was put to the test. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in Hickman, Kennedy. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. However, planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga (CVA-14) crippled one of the boats and damaged the other two. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345 (accessed March 4, 2023). The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. THIS SECOND volume of the U.S. Navy's multivolume history of the Vietnam War is bound in the same familiar rich blue buckram that has styled official Navy histories since the Civil War and hence resembles its predecessors. . The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. 313-314. As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. 14. PTF-1 and PTF-5 raced toward shore. On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. A U.S. Navy SEAL (Sea Air Land) team officer assigned to the SOG maritime operations training staff, Lieutenant James Hawes, led the covert boat fleet out of Da Nang and down the coast 300 miles to Cam Ranh Bay, where they waited out the crisis in isolation. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. Congress supported the resolution with He also requested air support. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration of war. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." Badly damaged, the boat limped home. . With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. McNamara took advantage of Morses imprecision and concentrated on the senators connection between 34A and Desoto, squirming away from the issue of U.S. involvement in covert missions by claiming that the Maddox "was not informed of, was not aware [of], had no evidence of, and so far as I know today had no knowledge of any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands Senator Morse referred to." In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. The electronic intercept traffic cited here is too voluminous to permit a conclusion that somehow everything was the figment of the collective imaginations on both sides. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. 13. In the summer of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson needed a pretext to commit the American people to the already expanding covert war in South East Asia. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. originally appeared in the June 2008 issue of Vietnam magazine. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated PTF-3, PTF-4, PTF-5, PTF-6 (PTFfast patrol boat). 302-303. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. Oklahoma City Bombing. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. 1. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. WebKnown today as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, this event spawned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, ultimately leading to open war between North Vietnam and By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington.
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